NYC Container Ship Incident Also Ties to China
The evidence bears-out that through operational management relative to the national origins of operational management, the APL QINGDAO & Dali shipping incidents are asymmetrical warfare from China.
In the wake of the Dali/FSK bridge collapse that overwhelmingly presents as more asymmetrical warfare from China, another container ship identified as the Malta-based APL QINGDAO has experienced yet another highly suspicious incident that resulted in a near-collision with another bridge. Common threads between the Dali and the APL QINGDAO immediately emerge in a clear modus operandi by China: infrastructure, transportation, hazardous materials and strategic CCP geopolitical locations like Hong Kong, Singapore and, now, Malta.
This analysis is organized into sections:
The APL QINGDAO & New York
China’s Asymmetrical Warfare Modus Operandi
A Poorly Prioritized US Coast Guard
APL QINGDAO Details
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta & China & the CCP
Direct Link to China
Summary Findings
Concluding Remarks
1. The APL QINGDAO & New York
An item from Zero Hedge, which still requires confirmation according to its own reporting, indicates how on 06 Apr 24,
A massive container ship reportedly lost power on the Upper New York Bay – just before the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge connecting the New York City boroughs of Staten Island and Brooklyn.
According to Captain John Konrad, CEO of gCaptain, a New York City tugboat captain informed him that the 354-meter container ship APL QINGDAO “lost power while transiting New York harbor.”
“They had 3 escort tugs but 3 more were needed to bring her under control. They regained power & were brought to anchor near the Verrazano bridge,” the tugboat captain told Konrad.
Zero Hedge
2. China’s Asymmetrical Warfare Modus Operandi
It’s important to note that a clear modus operandi has been established within China’s asymmetrical warfare it’s waging against the US: targeting infrastructure, transportation and hazardous materials.
In the wake of the Dali/FSK attack, US authorities and defense personnel developed direct evidence of how China uses ships and shipping within its modus operandi for asymmetrical warfare.
This better positions US authorities and defense personnel to more effectively identify and intercede on such attacks before they move far enough in execution to cause the designed destruction; like leveraging the laws of physics to ram a cargo ship into a bridge support to collapse a bridge and critical piece infrastructure that also just happened to entrap two of the US Navy’s most important supply vessels for the foreseeable “months”.
I believe this to be the case with the APL QINGDAO where a quick response to apply three additional tugs avoided disaster designed by China and plausibly executed by proxies.
3. A Poorly Prioritized US Coast Guard
Consider the close proximity of the US Coast Guard relative to the APL QINGDAO location but where the Biden Administration’s version of the US Coast Guard has not publicly issued anything in the way of a BOLO on the container ship modus operandi; noting that the US Department of Defense has certainly issued something not publicly disclosed.
Despite the tragic nature of asymmetrical warfare from the victim’s perspective, we never seem to escape irony as is the case with the initial shipping container attack involving the Dali on 26 Mar 24.
On the same day as the Dali attack, the US Coast Guard issued this: “The U.S. Coast Guard is accepting applications to fill seven vacancies on the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee. This Committee advises the Secretary of Homeland Security, via the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard on matters relating to national maritime security, including on enhancing the sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks that may cause a transportation security incident, between relevant Federal agencies and State, local, and tribal governments; relevant public safety and emergency response agencies; relevant law enforcement and security organizations; maritime industry; port owners and operators; and terminal owners and operators.”
As required, notice was given to the Federal Register where it’s indicated that the application process will be closed on 28 May 24; meaning that 7 of 13 committee seats will remain vacant until at least that date.
The National Maritime Security Advisory Committee charter indicates:
The Committee shall consist of at least eight members, but not more than 21 members with particular expertise, knowledge, and experience in matters relating to the function of the Committee. Following procedures in 46 U.S.C. §70112(a)(3)(c), the Secretary will appoint at least one person to the following membership positions on the Committee:
Port authorities.
Facilities owners and operators.
Terminal owners and operators.
Vessel owners and operators.
Maritime labor organizations.
The academic community.
State and local governments.
The maritime industry.
The members listed above are appointed as Representative members to represent the interests of their respective organizations or associations and are not Special Government Employees as defined in 18 U.S.C. §202(a) . In accordance with 46 U.S.C. 15109(f)(2)(B), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall not seek, consider, or otherwise use information concerning political affiliation of a nominee in making an appointment to the Committee. In order for the Department, to fully leverage broad-ranging experience and education, the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee must be diverse with regard to professional and technical expertise. The Department is committed to pursuing opportunities, consistent with applicable law, to compose a committee that reflects the diversity of the United States.
The current committee is comprised of 13 individuals according to its dedicated webpage last updated in 2022.
On 26 Mar 24, the US Coast Guard also made this announcement noting the NY location: “The National Navigation Safety Advisory Committee will conduct a series of public meetings over two days in the Bronx, New York, to discuss matters related to maritime collisions, allisions, and groundings; Inland Rules of the Road; International Rules of the Road; navigation regulations and equipment; routing measures; marine information; and aids to navigation systems.”
In advance of the Dali attack, the US Coast Guard was more concerned about “sexual misconduct” than international terrorism or asymmetrical warfare from China, according to Rear Adm. Wayne Arguin, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy and his discussion on Coast Guard priorities on 15 Mar 24: “We are committed to strictly enforcing policies against sexual misconduct, advancing our cybersecurity infrastructure, and implementing effective maritime regulations,” said Arguin. “These efforts are crucial for developing a maritime sector that’s resilient, forward-looking, and adaptable to the challenges of a changing world.”
As ships began ramming and collapsing bridges; or attempting to, the Coast Guard was focused on things more suitable for discussion in an elementary school faculty meeting: The The Joint ILO/IMO Tripartite Working Group to Identify and Address Seafarers’ Issues, Human Element Recommends Actions to Address Violence, Sexual Harassment, Bullying, and Assault.
Again, that is the UN/China vernacular for communism.
DID ANYONE IN THE MSM OR INDEPENDENT MEDIA REPORT ON THIS?
Interestingly and relative to the Dali and Baltimore, the US Coast Guard issued this 6 days before the Dali attack on 20 Mar 24: VIDEO/AUDIO RELEASE: Coast Guard continues to investigate hoax distress calls near Baltimore, seeks community support to identify caller’s voice.
Beginning on 17 Feb 24, an individual began “making multiple false distress calls that are originating from the Baltimore area,” where and peculiarly so, “At least 16 hoax calls have been transmitted over VHF channel 16.”
Was someone trying to draw attention to the waters of Baltimore in advance of the Dali to get eyes-on and avert a planned disaster?
I think there is a strong argument for that but little in the way of evidence to back it beyond the anecdotal evidence currently available.
Watch and listen to two of the Baltimore hoax calls:
SIDEBAR: CAN’T MAKE-UP THIS STUFF
First, I don’t believe in the type of thing that follows [numerology, etc.], but it is worth mentioning because of its obvious head-scratching peculiarity.
Second, I place great value in pattern recognition relative to enterprise fraud and I excel at it leading to this, which just seemed odd for the pattern that emerged [for entertainment purposes only]: 16 false distress calls on VHF channel 16 in Baltimore beginning 38 days before the Dali attack and where the Coast Guard only reported on it 6 days before the Dali attack?
16 + 16 = 32 + 6 = 38… peculiar, yes, but not worthy beyond the novelty of it.
Examination of the US Coast Guard communications could not determine any BOLO or similar advisory on the use of container ships as weapons of terrorism and war during the relevant time period during, before and after the Dali event.
GO DEEPER ON THE US COAST GUARD
With US Coast Guard communications:
4. APL QINGDAO Details
The reporting at ZH on the APL QINGDAO includes this image featured in a Xwitter post from Captain Konrad from which we will develop our analysis:
Relative to the APL QINGDAO, we specifically, we latch onto the ship’s nationality [Malta], owner [CMA CMG (France)], ISM manager [CMA CMG International Shipping (Singapore)] and Ship manager/Commercial manager [CMA CGM Asia Shipping Pte. Ltd. (Singapore)].
The reporting at Zero Hedge misses critical geopolitical considerations that fully envelop the Dali/FSK bridge attack by China; all of which are laid-out in two parts of existing analysis relative to the APL QINGDAO:
The second piece of analysis more closely examines Synergy Marine Pte. Ltd. as the operational manager of the Dali.
Importantly, it’s the management of container ships that is more important than ownership for common sense reasons and for example, if you were to loan your automobile to a driver who then became drunk and crashed the vehicle causing property damage, there may be exposure for you as the owner while there certainly is exposure for the operator.
This is why the contractual and private equity relationships, which form the corporate architecture that China leverages, are so important.
The focus belongs on the contracted managers of container ships and their relationships more so than the owners; especially in China, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malta.
5. Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta & China & the CCP
When examining the operational management for the Dali – Synergy Marine Pte. Ltd. – two geographic overlays arose: Singapore [Synergy Marine Pte. Ltd. as a subsidiary of Synergy Marine Group as a subsidiary of Synergy Holdings International Limited, which became Unity Group Holdings International Limited] and Hong Kong [the location of Unity Group].
The analysis in the second piece makes the cogent argument [read the analysis for a fuller explanation, sources and citation]:
China acts at will and with impunity in Hong Kong and Singapore where the infiltration of the CCP, PLA and Chinese intelligence is ubiquitous and pervasive.
Tactically speaking, by operating, influencing, controlling and owning corporations and shell corporations to varying degrees in Hong Kong and Singapore, China functions with corporate proxies in ways to circumvent oversight, regulation or control by Western authorities.
When China, the CCP, the PLA and Chinese military intelligence want to yank a leash in a way that is problematic to track back to the source, the private:public interface and private equity architecture in Hong Kong and Singapore is the perfect mechanism.
Political Moonshine
Apply the geopolitical angles on Hong Kong and Singapore to Malta and the APL QINGDAO as overlaid by details from CMA CMG.
Note that in September 2023, China and Malta pledged to “deepen mutual cooperation,” which always entails diplomacy and economics to some degree; and military to varying degrees: China, Malta pledge to deepen mutual cooperation.
“Maltese President George Vella met with Wang, director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, at the presidential palace on Sunday, where Wang conveyed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s warm greetings to Vella and thanked him for his long-term contributions to promoting China-Malta friendship.”
CGTN
Note Malta’s direct support of “One China” which is an overlay to the deep and broad analysis into China’s hegemonic doctrine and the Belt Road Initiative so frequently referenced in the analysis:
China appreciates Malta’s adherence to the one-China principle, its objective and friendly view of China’s development, and its understanding and support for China’s legitimate advocacy, Wang noted.
CGTN
In short, Malta plugs-in exactly where Hong Kong and Singapore do in the initial analysis: as a witting and willing geopolitical partner in service to China and the CCP.
GO DEEPER ON CHINA & MALTA
Golden anniversary of diplomatic ties between Malta and China / “January 31, 2022, marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malta and China.”
6. Direct Link to China
From CMA CMG details are gleaned on the APL QINGDAO:
By latching onto the IMO Number provided by CMA CMG and going through Marinetraffic.com, we note that the APL QINGDAO is a container ship designated “Cargo – Hazard A (Major)” as an overlay to the analysis contending that China is targeting transportation [ships and rail cars] and hazardous materials in its asymmetrical warfare against the US.
According to the CMA CGM Qingdao Contact information page, the contact details for the APL QINGDAO contain the address “20TH FLOOR, ZHONGCHUANG BUILDING – NO169 SHENZHEN ROAD 266101 QINGDAO.”
By entering the APL QINGDAO contact address provided by CMA CMG into a map search, this location is produced:
The APL QINGDAO is flagged out of Malta with ownership attributable to France but with operational and safety management out of Singapore and contact information out of China.
7. Summary Findings
The first piece of intense and deep analysis laid-out positions on the corporate and private equity architecture in the international shipping industry that is being leveraged by China, the CCP and the PLA to engage in asymmetrical warfare against the US.
The second piece of analysis further evidenced the corporate architecture specific to the Dali’s operational management, which directly ties to two critical operational theaters for China and the CCP: Hong Kong and Singapore.
In this piece, the exact same analytical positions are overlaid with precision in application to the NYC/APL QINGDAO that also draw back to Singapore and extend in application to Malta while further extending directly to mainland China.
The first two pieces of analysis made attributions to China with high confidence and the analysis on the APL QINGDAO strengthens this confidence: The evidence bears-out that through operational management relative to the national origins of operational management, the APL QINGDAO and Dali shipping incidents are more asymmetrical warfare from China.
8. Concluding Remarks
The second piece of analysis included the quote below from The James Foundation as a review of the existing analysis on the CCP’s use of diplomacy and corporate architecture as weapons of asymmetrical warfare.
It bears repeating in overlay to the facts and analysis laid-out on the APL QINGDAO as an extension of the analysis into the Dali.
In short, this is how the CCP and PLA operate in asymmetrical warfare [Introduction from the James Foundation source]:
“As China rises on the world stage, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasingly utilizing all levers of influence to achieve and secure its national objectives along its periphery and globally. To achieve and secure those objectives, the CCP is employing political warfare. [1] Political warfare is a set of overt and covert tools used by governments to influence the perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors of other governments and societies in order to achieve national objectives. [2] Set within a broader discussion about how CCP engages in influence operations in Asia, Singapore presents a valuable case study for understanding the means by which the CCP engages in influence operations that target a majority ethnic-Chinese state.”
The James Foundation
The analysis here once again demonstrates the difference between “news” and analysis; where the “news” delivers post-event facts without identifying, analyzing or explaining the most important aspects of those facts; like asymmetrical warfare from China.
As with the case here, another internationally flagged container ship almost struck a bridge just like the Dali actually did and the “news” reported that.
What the “news” hasn’t reported but which this analysis has laid-out dead to rights is that all of this is asymmetrical warfare from China.
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......has there been any commentary as of now about exactly how much damage would've been done to the Verrazano-Narrows had there been an impact? I'm a BIG aficianado of it - for over 50 years, since childhood (actually sought to write a fiction novel about someone trying to blow it up, half that long ago - 1995, if memory serves me correctly - but, never finished it.....)
Excellent analysis. Here in the US we are aware that the western militaries often serve and protect their country of origin corporate interests abroad in other countries. Implicit in this is usually condemnation for the collusion between private and political interests.
My point is, we have a normalcy bias that this is not the norm and that this is a corrupt use of our tax dollars.
When dealing with the CCP & the PLA, one has to understand that the norm is the inverse.
CCP corporations are sovereign political tools first and profitability second. All corporate businesses from the CCP are not only an extension of the communist state but actively engaged in spearheading their communist, political interests. All mid-sized and larger Chinese corporations are required to have, and maintain, an internal CCP political department with oversight of the companies activities in the pursuit of CCP interests.
This is a radical departure from western business expectations. What are our normal business practices are not the same as the CCP normal business practices and failure to recognize that will lead to false conclusions.
Jack Ma got into trouble a few years ago for defying the CCP regime. When he returned to a much more subdued public presence, Jack dismissed his sudden and inexplicable disappearance to "just needing a break".